ha rmonia which Aristotle overlooks, in which a harmonia is something cau sal ly dependent on but distinct fromaa certain disposition of materials, e.g. a melody is distinct from the strings which produce it, and equally from the tuning of the strings, though wi th ou t strings there could be no tuning, and without tuni n g no melody.
The word has this sense especially in mu si c al contexts, meaning variously 'scale', 'mode' or g e nera lly 'music' (v. LSJ).
Given, then , that the el ements in question are those which compose the human body , hot , cold, etc. (which are pr esum ab ly thought of as different kinds of stuff) , there appear to be four po ssible interpretations of the thesis that the soul is a har mon i a of these elem ents :
a)
The soul is ide nti cal with the �atio or fo rmul a according to whtch the elem en ts are combined to form th e living man;
b)
Th e soul is i denti cal with th e mixture or combina tion of those · el em en ts according to th at formula; c)
Th e soul i s some entity produced by the combination of those elements according to that formula, but ·distinct.
alike from them and from· the formula itself;
d)
The soul is identical with a s tate of the bodily elements, viz. the state of being com bined according to that formula.
It mi ght be objected at this point that the third altern a tive is illusory, since even where the harmo nia is a scale or me lo dy it must be considered identical with a mixture of elements. This seems implausible on the assumption that the elements in q uestio n are s trin gs or other physical objects which compose the in st ru ment which produces the music, but this assumption is mis taken.
Just as the elements of a physical constitution, e.g. the livin g human body, are the hot, the cold and so on, so the e lem ents of a piece of music are the high and the low, which are conceived of as being mixed together in th e proper propor ti ons to gi ve the right notes, e ith er in t he sense th at each note is tho ught of as consisting of so much of the high mixed with so much of the low, or in the sense that each mode or scale is produced by combining so �any high notes in fixed ratios with so many low notes.
The ele men ts , therefore, out of which a musi cal harmonia is formed are themselves musical entities, the high and the low , and not the physical objects which produce the sounds.
This view of the elements of a musical harmonia is clea rly expressed for instance in the pseudo-Aristotelean tr e ati se De Mundo, 396b 7f f. (DK 22 B 10):
'Mu si c makes a si ngle harmonia-out of different sounds by mixing together high and low, long and short notes '.
On this view of a mus ical harmonia, then, the harmonia cannot be separated from it s e lem ent s , and so this view do e s not admit the third interpretation of the soul -h armon i a as an independent alternative to the first two.
But while thi s view of the nature of mu sic al harmonia appears to be th e standard viaw of musical theory, and give� the most exact parallel to 0th.er kinds of harmonia, e.g. the formation of physical substances out of the elements, or the production of a certain temperature by mixing the hot and the cold, it is not the view of musical harmonia which Simmias uses to illustrate his thesis that the soul is a harmonia.
For Simmias' presentation of his thesis involves positing a parallelism between two relations, of each of which the terms are a) a physical object and b) a non-physical entity causal ly dependent on that object. Thus corresponding to the incorpor eal soul we have the musical harmonia, which is 'invisible and incorporeal and all-beautiful and divine' (85e 5-6), while corresponding to the physical body we have not the high and the low but the physical strings and pegs of the lyre, which can be broken apart and left lying around after.the harmonia has vanished.
It is true that Sirn.mias slightly distorts the parallel when he says (85b 5-c 1) that the soul is a harmonia of the hot, cold, etc ., in the bo�y, since a more exact parallel to the strings etc., of the lyre would seem to be provided by the limbs and ·organs of the body than by their microsc o pic elements.
But the essential point is to contrast the incor poreal product with its physical cause, and in order to make this contrast it is unnecessary for Simmias clearly to distin guish the physical macroscopic parts of the body from their own elements, which are no doubt conceived of as minute but equally corporeal parts.
The relation of musical harmonia to its elements which Simmias is using cannot therefore be that between a scale or tune and the musical elements of high and low etc., but must be that between a musical instrument and some non-physical entity produced by a certain state of the instrument.
This, then, enables us immediately to eliminate the second of our four sugge s t ed interpretations of the soul harrnonia thesis, viz. that the soul is identical with the mixture or,combination of the bodily elements accord ing to a certaid ratid or formula.
For it would be clearly absurd to make a sharp contrast between the physical elements and the non-physical harmonia if the latter just was identical with the elements in a certain arrangement. It would be too fantastic to suggest that to ·· · every wel l -made table there corresponds a non -phy sical entity whi c h is related to the dispositions of its parts as the non p hys i c al soul is to the disposit ion of the bodily elements. This c omp arison , then, tends in the opposite dire c tion from the remark at 92d 2 that most people accept the soul -harmoni a thesis.
Further difficulty is created by th e description of the soul at 86b 9 as a mixture (krasis) of the bodily elements.
The word kras is , which is re g ularl y used as a synonym for Can Plato me an that the soul is identi cal neither with a ratio nor with any produ c t of a rat1o, but rather with a certain stat e of the body, viz.the stat� in which the elements of the b ody are in a ce rt ain ratio?
While on the one hand this would give a fair ac count of the compari son of the soul with works of art, on the other hand it fits rather 111 with the sharp contrast between the i nvisible , div ine musi cal harmoni a and the physical in s trument , while again it might well seem very dubious that most people believe that the soul is nothin g other than a bodily state.
There appear , then, to be hints in the text of the di alogue of support for all three po s sible interpr e t ations of the soul-harmo�ia thesis, a) t hat the soul is identical with a ratio of the bod i ly ele ments, b) that it is identical with some non-physi cal produ ct of that rat io and c) that it is identi c al with the state of being in that ratio. It might thus appear that Plato has failed to distinguish these alte rnatives ; before leaving this que s tion , however, we should look at som e evidence from other sources, to see whether they throw any ligh t on Plato's mean ing.
be natural to assume that it was current in the Pythagorean circle to which they belonged. It is not clear how much reliance can be put on this testimony, since there is obviously a possibility that it may derive ultimately from this very passage of the Phaedo. But whatever may be the truth about that, it is highly unlikely that Philolass' view of the soul can be reconciled with the harmonia theory as expounded by Simmias. For at 6la-62b it is implied that Philolaos taught that suicide was wrong on the ground that the soul is put by the gods in the body as a prison for a set time, and must not seek to escape before the time of its release, but that a philosopher will �elcome death, pre� sumably because his soul will have a better existence in separation from the body.
This is supported by a quotation from Philolaos given by Clement of Alexandria (DK 44 B 14)
'the soul is yoked to the body and as it were buried in this tomb as a punishment'.
The conclusion from this i� plain, that unlike his pupils who take part in the dialogue, Philo laos believed that the soul exists independently of the body.
It is not impossible that he may have held some version of the theory, in which the soul was a non-physical entity whose association with the body depended on the maintainance of the proper bodily ratio, but the divergence from the view expres sed by Simmias is so great that it is obviously fruitless to attempt to interpret the latter in such a way as to assimilate it to some conjectural reconstruction of Philolaos' view.
I conclude, then, that not only is there no evidence that the soul-harmonia thesis definitely identifies the soul either with a ratio of its elements or with the state of being in that ratio or with some entity dependent on the possession of that ratio, but that we can best account for what is said in the dialogue on the assumption that Plato did not clearly distin guish the three possibilities. Nor is this particularly sur prising; for in the first place the distinction is a very fine one between the soul's actually being a ratio and its being the state of having one's elements in a ratio, since in either case having a soul will be identical with having one's elements in a ratio.
It is possible.to be alear about the distinction only if one clearly distinghishes purely mathematical entities such as numbers from states of phy�ical objects which can be described in mathematical terms.
Failure to make this distinc tion was the ground of one of Aristotle's criticisms of the Pythagoreans (Met. A8, 989b29-990a32), while we have seen that the presentation of the thesis by Simmias in the dialogue is similarly unclear.
While the distinction between the soul as a ratio and as an entity supervening on the possession of a ratio is more obvious, Aristotle's example of health which we have already noticed indicates that that distinction too may be easy to overlook.
In c ons id eri n g Pl ato's arguments ag ainst the thesis we shall therefore have to regard them as concerned with a thesis which contains in an undifferentiated form the thr•ee alternative senses which we have considered.
Socrates' first argument against the thesis requires little comment.
He points out that it is inconsistent with the doctrine, which was earlier accepted, that all knowledge is in fact recol lection of what the soul had learnt in a previous existence when it was not ass oci a t e d with the body.
No harmonia can exist unless the elements of which it is a harmonia are already in existence, and hence if the soul is a harmonia of the bodily elements it cannot have h ad a previous n on-b odil y existence (9le-92e).
This argument is valid against any interpretation of the harmonia thesis; obviously a b o di ly state cannot exist unless some body exists of which it is the st ate, and equally obviously a non physical e nt ity causally dependent on a ratio of bodily elements cannot exist before those elements have been combined in that r atio.
A defender of the thesis might� however, argue that it is not cogent against the identification of the soul with the mathematical ratio itself.
For a ratio, being a timeless mathe matical entity, cannot itself be said to come into existence whenever it is embodied in some particular material.
Since it exists equally at all time, it may truly be said to have existed before a certain body ca me into being, and hence the argument from recollection does not refute this version of the thesis. This defence is not, however, adopted by Simmias, who agrees that his thesis is inconsistent with the doctrine that all knowledge is recollection.
Nor is it difficult to see why. For it is possible to de fend the soul-harmonia against this argument on ly at the cost of making it a ·universal; if a certain set of elements c omb ine in the ratio 3/4, then indeed that ratio existed before the combination of the elements, but the thing tha.t existed was the ratio 3/4, i.e., the very same ratio which is exempllf:ied whenever three units are related to four units. Thus anyone who held this theory would have to admit that it was logically possible for many things to have the same soul, includ ing things which w ould generally be reckoned inanimate, e.g., geometrical diagrams, since there is no reason why the same ratio which is embodied in a particular human being and is his soul might not also hold. between certain lines and angles.
It is not, of course, impossible that anyone may have believed something lik ; e this; it might, for instance, provide a theory to account for transmigration.
Empedocles would on this view have been a bush and a fish because one and the same ratio was embodied in bush, fish and Empedocles, i.e., they all had the same soul.
Simmias, however, will have none of this; if his version of the theory is interpreted as making the soul a mathematic al entity, it must be such an entity individuated by being embodied in these bodily elements.
As such it clearly c annot exist independently of the elements by reference to which it is individuated, any more than Socrates' height can exist independently of Socrat es , though in the sense in which Socrates' height is a univer sal , say four cubits, that length may be said always to have existed, or rather never to have come into �xistence, whether or not Socrates exists.
This way of looking at the soul-harmonia has the advantage of preserving as a necessary truth that different persons have numerically different souls, whereas on the other interpreta tion two contemporaneous persons might discover as the result of physiological investigation that they had the same soul.
It leaves the thesis open, however, to attack on the grounds of inconsistency with the doctrine of knowledge as recollec tion; whether one considers it ad�quately refuted on those grounds Will naturally depend on the strength of one's convic tion in the soul's pre-existence. This argument continues to its conclusion at 9�al2-b2; for convenience this whole argument may be called B.
Then at 94b4 Socrates returns to the set of premisses A, which he uses to construct the se cond argument, which we may call Al, whose conclusion is reached at 95a2.
While I shall deal first with argument B, it is necessary first to look at premisses A, in order to determine the relation they have to the principle with �hich Socrates · begins B.2
A begins with the acceptance by Simmias of the proposition that the qualities of a harmonia are determined by those of its elements (92e4G93a2; let this be labelled al). We then have three succesive applications of this principle, first to all activities and passivities of the harmonia (93a4-5; al.l) and then to a particular activity and some particular passivities which are ruled out by the principle.
In virtue of the prin ciple it is impossible for a harmonia to lead or control its elements, but it must rather be controlled by them (93a6-7;
al.11), and it is impossible for it to be affected in any way contrary to that which -its elements determine ( 93a8-9; al.12).
ry is al.11 and al.12 which provide the premisses for argument
At 93all-12 we have the principle which marks the begin ning of argument B:
'Well, now, doesn't every harmonia have to be the kind of harmonia which corresponds to the way that it is attuned (or arranged)1 (bl).
It is not easy to find a transla tion which is both exact and ·comprehensible but the next sen tence, giving an application of the principle, makes fairly clear what is meant; if a Harmonia is more attuned, then it is more (of) a harmonia, and if it is less attuned it is less (of)
1
The grounds for rejecting Philoponus' interpretation, which is followed, not without incoherence, by Archer-Hind and Hackforth, are cogently stated by Miss Hicken, pp. 17-8.
2
See Appendix a�arornmia (93al4-b2; bl.l ) . The difference is that whereas there we were concerned with the depen dence of the harmonia,on the elements, now we are concerned with its dependence on the state or process of being arranged er attuned.
Argument B proc eeds by way of two, further premisses, b2, that no soul is more or less (of) a soul than any other (93b4-7) and b3, that a good soul is in tune and a bad soul out of tune (93b8-cl0).
Neither of these premisses is felt to require any justification or explanation; the sense of the latter is clearly that the good man is not a prey to the conflicting desires and impulses which are the mark of the bad man, but has all his wants properly under con trol with a view to the attainment of the right ends.
We now come to one of the most problematical pas sages in the argument:
at 93dl-5 Socrates says that premiss b2 is the same as the propo s it ion (b2.l) that no harmonia is more or less ( of ) a harmonia than any other, and Simrnias agrees.
Of course b2 is not as it stands equivalent to this, and the question is what a ddit ional assumptions Plato must have used in order to produce what he considered a va l id equivalence. Clear ly we cannot arrive at such an equivalence simply by making the most obvious assumption , viz. the assumption under examination in this argument, that the soul is a harmonia, since taken together with b2 that would still al lowth at some harmoniai might be more or less h armoniai than others. But did Plato see that?
I am inclined to think that he did not , but rather assum ing that the' soul is a harmonia, took this to mean that every thing which is true of soul is also true of harmonia (using these terms in the unquantified style familiar from Aristotle).
In effect this is to confuse implication with equivalence, which seems a not unlikely error for Plato to commit at this stage in hi s philosophical development, since it is only in the Sophist that he clearly distinguishes predication from identity.
The standard modern interpretation of this s ente nce , adopted by Archer-Hind, Bluck, Hackforth and Miss Hicken (but not by Burn et ) differs from the above in taking Socrat es to be assert ing not a general proposition about all harmoniai, but a specific proposition about the sort of harmoniai, that souls are, viz.
that no soul-harmonia is more or less of a harmonia than any other.
As this requires an a dmit te dly unnatural reading of the text as it stands, many scholars (see Hackforth's note, p. 116) have suggested removing the word harmonias from d4, thus making the sentence read 'And this (namely the admission that no soul is more or less (of) a soul than any other) is the admission that no fuoul) is more or less a h armoni a than any other.' But since this emen d a tion lacks any man u script aut horit y , and des troys what looks like a very emphatic and deliberate parallelismm of sentence construction, it is worth asking whether there are cogent grounds either for emending the text, or for reading the received text in other than its natural sense.
The strangest ground appears to be that urged e.g. by Miss Hicken, that since the argument is to depend on the assumption that some harmoniai (in particular, goodness) admit of degrees, it would be flatly inconsistent if Plato also used the assumption that no harmonia admits of degrees.
I doubt the cogency of this argument, which seems to me to depend on a confusion· over the notion of 'degrees of attunement'.
For the thesis that some harmoniai (e.g. goodness) admit or degrees comes to this, that ! some things, e.g. the parts of the soul, may be so arranged as to approximate more or less closely to s £me norm which represents the perfect arrangement of those things. B�t that is in no way in compatible with the thesis which I take Plato to be asserting at 93dl-5, viz . that if what a thing is is a harmonia, it can't be more or less a harmonia than anythin� else.
This amounts to an extension of the truism 'Everything is what it is', and ap plies equally to degrees of harmonia, in the sense just explain• ed.
Every inter-relation of parts of the soul, at ·whatever remove .. from the norm, is an inter-relation of parts.
There is, then, no general incompatibility between the thesis 'No harmonia is more or less a harmonia than any other' and 'Some things are more attuned (in Platonic terms 'partake more of harmonia') than others'.
Plato, however, thinks contradiction arises if one tries to say that one harmonia is more attuned than some other: that he is wrong even in this restricted thesis will be seen once the argument is viewed as a whole.
The next step (93d6-8) is that something which is neither more nor less (of) a harmonia is neither more or less attuned: this follows directly by contraposition from bl.l, and may hence be called bl.2. Another problematic sentence follows (d9-10): 'And does that which is neither more nor less attuned partake more or less of attunement, or to just the same extent? To the same extent.'
At first sight it might appear that this is the converse of the pr6position stated immediately before (and it is so taken by Miss Hicken): But, firstly, in contrast to the previous sentence, where the subject is 'that which is neither more nor less a harmonia', the predicate of 39-lOis 'partakes of (i.e. is characterised by) harmonia more or less'. One might indeed see here a further confusion of predication and identity, but the shift in terminology is presumably intend ed to indicate that a new point is being made. Secondly, if d9-10 is interpreted as 'Something which is neither more nor
1
Another sense in which harmoniai admit of degrees is e�em plified by temperature, where the inter-relation of hot and cdld:!.ma.kes up a continuous scale, but that is irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion, since there is no norm of heat or cold, and so no sense in which one temperature might be thought to be more or less arranged than another� less a t t une d is neither more nor less a harmonia, 'it has no subsequent role in the argument, whereas if it is read 'Something which is neither more nor less attuned is neither more nor less harmonious', we have a straightforward a r g ument of a syllogistic form, as will be seen below.
·
Socrates next conc l ude s (93dl2-e2) that no soul is more or less attuned or arran ge d than any other, givin� as premisses b2 and apparently bl.2.
But clear ly some additional premisses are require d , viz.
the understoodassumption that the soul is a harmonia and b2.l, that no harmonia is more or less a harmonia than any other.
In fact the c onc l usi on follows from the set wo together with bl.2, without depending on b2, but since Plato regarded b2 and b2.l as equivalent he would not h�ve noticed the r edundancy.
From this point on the argument proceeds strai�ht forwardly.
From b5 and b 6 it follows syllogistically that no soul is more or le ss harmonious than any other (e4-5) and hence, by b3 that no soul is better or worse than any other.
It is agree d (94al2-b3) that thi s conc lu s ion is absurd, and hence one of the premisses from which it is derived must be false;
obviously, the one to be rejected is the assumption that the soul is a harmonia. It appears, therefore that in B we have a single argument which is, despite some obscuritie s c lear in it s main lines and ( perhap s not so c learly ) fallacious.
The flaw is not simply in the fallacious equivalence of b2 and b2.l, since one might patch this up by introducing b2.l as an independent assumption; it is perfectly plausible to suggest that. where ¢ is a predicate saying what kind of this its s ub j e ct is if A and B are both ¢ s, A can ' t be more ( of) a � than B.
A more serious flaw is that the kind of harmonia whose presence or ab s ence makes a soul good or bad l s not the same kind as that which makes a soul to be a soul; the latter is a harmonia of bodily elements, vi he i• e as the fgrmer is a harmonia of parts of the s o ul , or of desire s and emotions, or similar psy chical entities.
Thus when
Plato argues that because no soul can be more of a soul-harmonia than any other therefore no soul can have more 'virtue'-harmonia than any other, he is guilty of a fall acy of equivocation.
An illu s tration should make the point clear.
One might reasonably say that some p iece of music was a harmonia in that it was pro duced by strings playing together in certain ratios, and yet that 1 it lacked h armon i a in that some of the strings were out of tune with one another. 1 We may thus reject the opinion of most com mentator s ( most vigorously expre ssed by Mi ss Hicken ) that to say that something which is a harmonia either has or lacks a harmonia is as absurd as to say that a blow is either vulnerable or invul nerable or that a length either has or lacks a length. And in rejecting thi s opinion we reject Plato's argument and defend the propriety of holding both that that the soul is an entity which depend s on some relation of bodily elements and that it itself contains parts or faculties which can be better or wor se integrat e d with one another.
Put like thatll these propositions both seem reason able enough, and it is perhaps surpri s in g to no t ice the eagerness with which writers on Plato have insisted that one mu st abandon one or the other. 
